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PNopER-Gmrs-Tim PRAcncAL STATUS OF THE JoinT BANK AccoUNT
WrrH BIGcHr OF StmvvoRsnm m KFrucx=-In 1940 Iva Coy Hays pur-
chased, with her own money, eight $1,000 United States bonds. These
bonds were made payable to her or to her husband, J. Smith Hays. In
1950 Mr. Hays cashed the bonds and deposited the proceeds in a bank
to the account of "Iva Coy Hays or J. Smith Hays, joint tenants with
the right of survivorship." Mrs. Hays signed the signature card. After
Mrs. Hays' death, this action was brought to settle the conflicting
claims between the administrator of her estate and Mr. Hays to the
money in the joint bank account. The Circuit Court of Clark County
ruled in favor of the administrator and Mr. Hays appealed. Held:
Affirmed. There was some evidence that Mrs. Hays did not intend to
made a gift inter vivos of this money to her husband. However, the
court said that regardless of this evidence, there was not such clear
and convincing evidence of a donative intent as is necessary to sustain
an inter vivos gift that is first asserted after the death of the donor,
when a close and confidential relationship existed between the parties.
There was no effective third party beneficiary contract between Mrs.
Hays and the bank because there was no intent to create a binding
obligation, and there was no mutual valuable consideration to support
the contract. Judge Hogg dissented saying that there was expressly
created a joint bank account With right of survivorship, and that the
controlling question was whether or not Mrs. Hays intended to create
the account. Hays v. Hays' Adm'r., 290 S.W. 2d 795 (Ky. 1956).
This is a case of first impression in Kentucky1 and as such may have
effects in the future which are disproportionate to the actual scope of
the decision. The validity of the claim of a survivor to the money in a
joint bank account with survivorship, when the account was created
by the deceased depositor, has been considered by most of the other
jurisdictions, but their results have differed greatly.
The majority of states have held that the deposit of money in a
joint bank account with right of survivorship, without further evidence
of intent, is not such manifestation of donative intent as will sustain a
gift inter vivos. 2 However, a substantial minority have held that such
1 There is no other Kentucky case which considers the gift theory in
determining the right of a survivor to a joint bank account with right of survivor-
ship. Two cases have upheld the survivor's claim on a contractual basis, but both
appear to have been decided upon third-party creditor beneficiary contract prin-
ciples. In the first, the obligation owing from the depositor to the survivor seems
to have been only a moral obligation. See Armstrong's Ex'r v. Morris Plan Indus-
trial Bank, 282 Ky. 192, 138 S.W. 2d 359 (1940). In the second both parties
contributed to the account, and thus there was consideration furnished by each
of them, although the court indicated that this was unnecessary. Bishop v. Bishop's
Ex'r, 293 Ky. 652, 170 S.W. 2d 1 (1943).
27 Am. Jur. Banks sec. 428 (1938); Annot., 135 A.L.R. 993 (1941); Annot.,
48 A.L.R. 189 (1927). See, e.g., Albers v. Young, 119 Colo. 87, 199 P. 2d 890
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a deposit is prima facie evidence of donative intent,3 while a few others
seem to hold that it is conclusive evidence of such intent.
4
Although most states still apply principles of gift law to the de-
termination of the right of a survivor to a joint bank account,5 an in-
creasing number of states are deciding the issue on the basis of third-
party beneficiary contract law concepts." Generally these jurisdictions
hold that the survivor takes the account, if it is shown that the de-
positor had an intent to confer a gift or benefit at the time he entered
into the contract with the bank.7 The courts which so decide the
question are seemingly more prone to find that the contract was made
with donative intent than are courts which look to gift law as a basis
for their holding.8 Most of these courts appear to hold that the creation
of a joint bank account with the right of survivorship is at least pre-
sumptive evidence of donative intent.9 And a few seem to hold that
such an account raises a conclusive presumption of donative intent, in
the absence of fraud or duress.10
The one element of general accord among all the jurisdictions is
that the controlling question is the intention with which the deposit
was made, and this is true regardless of whether the decision is based
on gift law or contract law.
(1948); Ogle v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N.E. 2d 550 (1946); Drain v. Brookline
Say. Bank, 327 Mass. 435, 99 N.E. 2d 160 (1951); Nashua Trust Co. v. Heghene
Mosgovian, 97 N.H. 17, 79 A. 2d 636 (1951); Green v. Comer 193 Okla. 133, 141
P. 2d 258 (1948). But see Brown, Personal Property sec. 65 (2d ed. 1955).
3 7 Am. Jur. Banks sec. 428 (1938). See. e.g., In re Lewis Estate, 194 Miss.
480, 13 So. 2d 20 (1943); Commercial Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.
2d 817 (1950); Link v. Link; 3 N. J. Super. 295, 65 A. 2d 89 (1949); Holbrook
v. Hendrick's Estate, 175 Ore. 159, 152 P. 2d 573 (1944); In re Fells Estate, 369
Pa. 597, 87 A. 2d 310 (1952).
4State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P. 2d 989 (1948);
In re Holtz's Will, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 362 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
5 Brown, Personal Property sec. 65 (2d ed. 1955).
(;See First Nat. Bank of Aurora v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 Pac. 1110
(1928); Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 319 Ill. 185, 141 N.E. 546
1923); Malone v. Sullivan, 136 Kan. 193, 14 P. 2d 647 (1932); Kittredge v.
Manning, 317 Mass. 689, 59 N.E. 2d 261 (1945); Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg.
Ass'n Co., 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E. 2d 751, 135 A.L.R. 988 (1941); In re
Edwards' Estate, 140 Ore. 431, 14 P. 2d 274 (1932); Deal's Adm'r v. Merchants'
& Mechanics' Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917); Wisner v. Wisner,
82 W. Va. 9, 95 S.E. 802 (1918); In re Stayer's Estate, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W.
655 (1935); see also 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking sec. 286 (1938), Annot., 103
A.L.R. 1123 (1936).
77 Am. Jur. Banks see. 436 (1937).
8 See cases cited in notes 9 and 10 infra. Compare Drain v. Brookline Say.
Bank, 327 Mass. 435, 99 N.E. 2d 160 (1951), with Kittredge v. Manning, 317
Mass. 689, 59 N.E. 2d 261 (1945).
9 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking sec. 286 (1938). See Kittredge v. Manning
and In re Edwards' Estate, supra note 6. See also Malone v. Sullivan, First Nat.
Bank of Aurora v. Mulich, and Wisner v. Wisner, supra note 6, for cases in which
the courts have seemingly inferred intent from the deposit alone since no mention
of the requisite of donative intent is made.
10 See Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n Co., In re Staver's Estate, and
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, supra note 6.
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The presence of Mr. Hays' name on the bonds seems to have di-
verted the court's attention from the actual issue of the case, since it
held that the controlling question was whether or not Mrs. Hays in-
tended to make a gift of the bonds to her husband. It is submitted that
the controlling question was not whether Mrs. Hays intended to make
a gift of the bonds to her husband, but rather, whether she intended
to make a gift to her husband of either the bonds or the proceeds there-
of when placed in the joint bank account. Mrs. Hays could have
intended to make a gift of the proceeds of the bonds, regardless of a
lack of such intent at the time she purchased the bonds.
The court found a lack of intent to make a gift of the bonds from
the following evidence: (1) Mr. Hays testified that at no time did his
wife state or express" any intention of giving him the bonds; (2) in
her will, Mrs. Hays listed the bonds as part of her investments; and
(3) Mr. Hays testified that on numerous occasions his wife had ex-
pressed her desire that the $8,000 be used for the expenses of the last
illnesses and burials of herself and her husband.
If one accepts the premise that the controlling issue was the intent
Mrs. Hays had when she signed the signature card creating the ac-
count, it is evident that a finding of lack of donative intent was not
supported by the evidence upon which the court relies. This is true
because: (1) a verbal intent to make a gift is unnecessary, since intent
may be manifested by acts or words or it may be inferred from the
relation of the parties and the surrounding facts and circumstances;'-
(2) the reference to the bonds in Mrs. Hays' will only goes to show
that she did not intend to make a gift at the time she purchased the
bonds, for by the reference in the will to the bonds as such, it is clear
that the will was made before the bank account was created; hence,
such reference could have no probative value in showing Mrs. Hays'
intention when she signed the signature card; and (3) the desire that
the $8,000 be used for the expenses of the last illnesses and burials of
herself and her husband hardly gives evidence that she did not intend
to make a gift of the money. Such expressions could just as plausibly
indicate how Mrs. Hays wished her husband would spend the money,
which would be entirely his, if she were to predecease him.13
What the court means by a lack of mutual valuable consideration
to support the contract is unclear. The only mutual consideration
"1It would seem that Mr. Hays should have argued that the act ofsgng
the signature card creating the account was an expression of an intention to donate
the money.
1224 Am. Jur. Gifts sec. 21 (1939); 38 C.J.S. Gifts sec. 15 (1943).
' 3 How could this desire better be carried out, in so far as Mr. Hays' last
illness and burial is concerned, by leaving the money to her administrator and
hence to her heirs?
[Vol. 47,
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necessary to sustain third-party donee beneficiary contracts is that
between the donor and the promissor,14 which in this case would be
Mrs. Hays and the bank. That there is mutual consideration sufficient
to support a contract between a depositor and a bank cannot be
doubted. There need be no consideration running from the donee in
such a contract. Moreover, the donee need not even know of the con-
tract at the time of its creation in order for it to be valid; he can en-
force it upon learning of its existence.15 The only valid issue here, as
in the gift considerations is whether or not the alleged donor intended
to make a gift or confer a benefit.'
The principal case is not strong precedent, and the effect of the
decision on future litigation is difficult to evaluate. The decision of
the case necessarily rests on the holding that Mrs. Hays did not have
the donative intent necessary to sustain an inter vivos gift at the time
the deposit was made. However, there is no direct evidence in the
opinion that this was the real basis for the decision because as pre-
viously mentioned the court's attention had been diverted to determin-
ing Mrs. Hays' intention with respect to the gift of the bonds. In
holding that there was no effective third-party beneficiary contract,
the court also seems to have carried the finding of a lack of intent at
the time the bonds were purchased over to the time of the deposit,
without further consideration of the question of intent. It is submitted
that this was a compounding of the original error. But by so finding a
lack of donative intent, the questionable statements as to mutual
valuable consideration are relegated to the status of dictum and are
not binding in the future. Thus it appears that both branches of the
case were primarily decided upon the basis of the intention of Mrs.
Hays at the time she purchased the bonds.
The questionable and indirect manner in which the controlling issue
was resolved makes the effects of this decision unclear. In the future
the court may look upon this case as precedent for a number of con-
clusions. Some examples of the possibilities are: (1) The court may
interpret the case as holding that the act of creating a joint bank ac-
count with survivorship, in and of itself, is not sufficient manifestation
of donative intent to sustain a gift inter vivos, or a third-party donee
14Bishop v. Bishop's Ex'r, 293 Ky. 652, 170 S.W. 2d 1 (1943) (dictum);
Restatement, Contracts see. 133 (1932)- Simpson, Contracts sec. 81 (1954).
15 12 Am. Jur. Contracts see. 288 ( 1938).16 To sustain a gift, in addition to donative intent, there must be effective
delivery and acceptance by the donee. 24 Am. Jur. Gifts sec. 22 (1937). The
delivery to the bank is held to be sufficient, and the acceptance presumed. Brown,
Personal Property sec. 65 (2d ed. 1955). The contract theory requires a valid
contract created with donative intent. The contract with the bank is valid.
Thus the only requirement generally in issue, under either theory, is the in-
tention of the depositor at the time of the deposit.
1959]
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beneficiary contract. (2) The dictum as to requiring mutual valuable
consideration between the depositor and survivor could easily be con-
strued to mean that Kentucky will not recognize such a deposit as an
enforceable third-party donee beneficiary contract. (8) The opinion
could manifest a policy of the court against allowing survivorship in
such cases. 17 (4) The court could feel that this decision should have
no value as a precedent since the controlling issue was not directly
decided.
Restricted to its facts, the present case holds that a survivor's claim
to money in a joint bank account with survivorship cannot be main-
tained upon evidence of the creation of the account alone, when there
is some evidence that the depositor did not intend to confer a gift.
From the court's language, it is impossible to say what evidence of
lack of donative intent, if any, is necessary to defeat a survivor's claim
based solely upon the deposit. What additional evidence of donative
intent would have been necessary before the court would have
sustained the gift or contract?
The effect of this decision is so speculative that a Kentucky bank,
if well advised, will be reluctant to take a joint account with survivor-
ship, if it will accept it at all. Since it is difficult to say what evidence
of donative intent would satisfy the Kentucky Court, a bank could not
safely deliver the balance of the account to either the survivor or ad-
ministrator prior to a judicial determination of their rights. Yet a bank
could not with impunity refuse to deliver the money to the party
entitled to it.'8 It would seem, therefore, that this decision has made
it rather imprudent for a bank to take such an account, and that in the
future banks will be hesitant to commit themselves by taking survivor-
ship accounts.19
What effect should a court give the act of creating a joint bank
account with the right of survivorship? There is no public policy
against allowing survivorship in such cases as this,2o and there is no
17 If so, the court would seemingly not be in accord with the express intent
of the legislature. See Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 881.130 (1959).
Is It midght be argued that a bank could bring an action of interpleader and
pay the money into court and absolve itself of liability. See Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 22 (1956). However, it is believed that a bank would
avoid this expensive and cumbersome method of doing business, and would simply
refuse to take an account if it felt that there would be a possibility of such con-
troversy after the death of one of the parties.
3
9 This is assuming that banks will view this case in its worst possible light,
and proceed accordingly. A bank if pressed by a depositor could probably protect
itself by requiring the depositor to execute a written declaration of intention which
expressly manifests an unequivocal intention to make a gift and authorizes the
bank to pay the money to the survivor. This might be supplemented by oral
questioning by a teller or other employee to make absolutely certain that the
depositor understood the meaning of the written declaration.
20 See Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 881.130 (1959) which expressly provides for
survivorship between joint tenants if the intention is properly manifested.
[Vol. 47,
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reason why a party should not be able to dispose of his money in such
a manner if he so desires. Generally, unequivocal acts are given more
weight than verbal expressions in going to prove the intent of the
actor. One who intentionally does an act will not be heard to say that
he did not intend the legal consequences of that act. The same should
apply here. The act of Mrs. Hays, in creating the account, was not
ambiguous.21 She clearly intended to sign the signature card, and in
the absence of a showing of fraud or duress, her administrator should
be bound thereby. The legal results necessarily flowing from an in-
tentional act should in no way be affected by verbal protestations that
these results were not intended.
The Kentucky Court seems to have promulgated an undesirable
doctrine. Whether it has done so depends upon its future construction
of this case. There is no valid reason why such an account as in the
principal case should not be given the effect which is normally in-
tended by the depositor. In the absence of fraud or duress, such an
account can have but one purpose-to permit both parties to draw
upon the account during their joint lives, with the balance to go to the
survivor upon the death of either party. It is hoped in the future, that
the court, if faced with a similar case, will not permit a survivor's claim
to the balance of an account to be defeated so easily.
Unless fraud or duress is shown, a bank paying an account to a
survivor should be protected against claims such as the administrator
in this case asserted. If the court will not protect the bank, and thus
give effect to such an account, the General Assembly should take
cognizance of the problem and enact appropriate legislation.
22
Carl R. Clontz
WOKMIEN's COMPENsATiN-INsuRANCE-"FuL CovxiAcE"-The em-
ployee was killed while driving a taxicab for his employer who
operated a theater, garage and taxi service in connection with the
garage. The deceased did general work around the garage, was car-
ried on the garage payroll, and customarily operated his employer's
one-car taxi service when a fare called. The "risk classifications" in the
employer's insurance policy related to automobile salesmen and garage
chauffeurs. Since the activity of the deceased at the time of the
21 If the account was merely a joint account, it might be argued that it was
created for business convenience only. But this argument is of no avail when
survivorship is added, since the addition could in no way facilitate any business
purpose.22 Many states have to protected their banks. Brown, Personal Property sec.
65 (2d ed. 1955).
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